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Cooperative search games are collective tasks where all agents share the same goal of reaching a
target in the shortest time while limiting energy expenditure and avoiding collisions. Here we show
that the equations that characterize the optimal strategy are identical to a long-known phenomeno-
logical model of chemotaxis, the directed motion of microorganisms guided by chemical cues. Within
this analogy, the substance to which searchers respond acts as the memory over which agents share
information about the environment. The actions of writing, erasing and forgetting are equivalent to
production, consumption and degradation of chemoattractant. The rates at which these biochemi-
cal processes take place are tightly related to the parameters that characterize the decision-making
problem, such as learning rate, costs for time, control, collisions and their trade-offs, as well as the
attitude of agents toward risk. We establish a dictionary that maps notions from decision-making
theory to biophysical observables in chemotaxis, and vice versa. Our results offer a fundamental
explanation of why search algorithms that mimic microbial chemotaxis can be very effective and
suggest how to optimize their performance.
Introduction. Individuals in a group often have to
face complex situations which require concerted actions
[1–3]. Among the various collective intelligence problems,
here we focus our attention on cooperative navigation
tasks, where all agents share the common goal of locat-
ing a target and reaching it in the most efficient way.
For instance, a crowd may need to quickly escape from
an enclosed space while averting stampedes. Similarly,
birds in a flock or fish in a school try to reduce exposure
to predators and avoid harmful collisions. In addition,
individuals are also confronted with the limits posed by
the energetic costs of locomotion. The very same kind of
objectives and challenges lie at the heart of multi-agent
autonomous robotics[4–7].
Intelligent agents should aim at acting optimally in
these contexts. That is, they should cooperate in order to
minimize some cost function that compounds the many
objectives at play: short time for completing the task,
small energy spent in the process, and reduced damage
by collisions. What is the optimal strategy? How univer-
sal is it across environments and agents? How is informa-
tion shared by agents? How is it translated into actions?
Can the optimal behavior be reliably and quickly learned
by agents facing unknown environments? Is the optimal
strategy actually employed by living organisms?
In this paper we answer these questions by formulating
the cooperative search game in terms of stochastic opti-
mal control. We first discuss how optimal solutions can
be mapped into quantum states of an interacting many-
body system. Unfortunately, the exact solution of this
quantum problem is very difficult even in simple geome-
tries. However, in the limit of very large collectives, a
mean-field theory yields very simple and well-known ef-
fective equations.
Indeed, the mean-field equations for optimal cooper-
ative search turn out to be identical to a long-known
phenomenological model of chemotaxis, the celebrated
Patlak–Keller–Segel model [8, 9] with Weber–Fechner
logarithmic response (see e.g. [10] for a general discussion
about fold-change detection). The chemical attractant
can therefore be interpreted as the medium that agents
use to share information about the location of the target
and the density of individuals in the group. The bio-
physical processes by which the concentration is altered,
namely production, consumption and degradation, corre-
spond to the actions of writing information on the mem-
ory, erasing and forgetting, respectively. We show that
there is a dictionary that maps concepts from decision-
making theory – strategies, desirability, costs for control
and for collisions, cost per time elapsed, attitude toward
risk – into precise physico-chemical and biological corre-
lates – concentration levels, diffusion coefficients, degra-
dation and consumption rates, chemotactic coefficients
(see Table I for the detailed analogy).
Optimal cooperative search. Let us consider a group
of agents whose goal is to reach some target while min-
imizing a cost function that is a sum over several con-
tributions: time to reach the target, energy expenditure
and a penalty for collisions.
The dynamics of the agents is given by a drift-diffusion
equation
dXi
dt
= ui +
√
2Dηi(t) (1)
where the subscript i labels the agent, Xi are the posi-
tions, ui are the individual controls, and ηi are indepen-
dent standard white noises, 〈ηi(t) ηj(t′)〉 = δi,jδ(t − t′).
Uncontrolled motility is characterized by the constant
diffusion coefficient D. In general, the controls ui depend
on the spatial configuration of all agents X1 . . . XN . The
cost per unit time paid by the agent i is
ci = q(Xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
time
+
γ
2
u2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
energy
+
g
2
∑
j 6=i
δ(Xi −Xj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
collisions
. (2)
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2Decision making Chemotaxis
ζ Desirability s Chemoattractant concentration
D Uncontrolled dynamics D Random motility
u∗ Optimal control χ∇ log s Chemotactic drift with logarithmic sensing
γ
Weight for the cost of
control χ = 2D/(1− 2Dαγ) Chemotactic coefficient
α Risk sensitivity
q Time cost rate Ds = D/ Diffusion coefficient of chemoattractant
g Collision cost rate k = q(1− 2Dαγ)/2Dγ Degradation rate of chemoattractant
1/ Learning rate β = g(1− 2Dαγ)/2Dγ Consumption rate of chemoattractant per cell
Eq. (11)
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation
Eq. (9) Patlak-Keller-Segel equations
TABLE I. A dictionary between optimal cooperative search and chemotaxis. The table illustrates the correspondence between
quantities in mean-field optimal control and their counterparts in chemotaxis.
The total cost accumulated along the search process by
the agent i is the integral of the cost rate ci over time.
When the agent reaches the target the cost does not in-
crease anymore. The cooperative search is completed
when all the agents have reached the target.
The cost features three contributions. The first one is
the penalty for the time spent before reaching the target.
We denote the associated cost per unit time as q. The
second one is the cost of control, that we take as γu2/2.
This is reminiscent of the power dissipation due to mo-
tion in a viscous medium, but can also be interpreted as
the Kullback-Leibler divergence from a random strategy
in the decision-making context [11]. Other choices are
possible that leave the scenario below largely unchanged
(see SI, Sec. ). Finally, the last term arises from colli-
sions. The general case of longer-range interactions be-
tween agents is discussed in the Supporting Information
(SI, Section 1). This combination of factors embodies the
trade-offs between different costs that lead to nontrivial
solutions of the optimization problem: for instance, a
fast search and a low collision risk cannot be achieved
without a consequent expenditure in control cost.
The optimal control for the multi-agent system is the
set of vector fields u∗i that minimize the total cost aver-
aged over all the possible trajectories of the agents un-
der the controlled dynamics 〈∑i ∫ cidt〉 where the aver-
age is taken over the paths described by Eq. (1). This is
the usual risk-neutral formulation of the optimal control
problem, which corresponds to setting α = 0 in Table I
— see below for the risk-sensitive case. See Fig. 1 in the
SI for a schematic representation of the control problem.
The minimization of the cost functional can be per-
formed by the Pontryagin minumum principle [12]. This
leads to the (non-linear) optimality Bellman equations,
which can then be cast into a linear form by means of a
Hopf–Cole transform [11] (see Section 1.1 of SI for a full
derivation). The optimal control turns out to be
u∗i = 2D∇i logZ , (3)
where the desirability Z(x1 · · ·xN ) satisfies the linearized
Bellman equation
−D
∑
i
∇2iZ +
1
2Dγ
∑
i
hi Z = 0 , (4)
where hi(x1 · · ·xN ) is the contribution to the single-
agent cost ci given by time expenditure and collisions,
hi = q(xi) + (g/2)
∑
j 6=i δ(xi − xj). The desirability Z
is a non-negative function of the configuration which is
closely related to the optimal cost function C∗(x1 . . . xN ).
The latter is defined as the minimum expected value of
the total cost for an initial configuration x1 . . . xN , which
is achieved under the optimal control u∗. Explicitly, one
has Z = exp[−C∗/2Dγ]. It is then clear that the optimal
control biases the motion of the agents towards config-
urations with lower expected cost. Eq. (4) has to be
supplemented by appropriate boundary conditions, i.e.
Z = 0 for forbidden configurations, Neumann conditions
on rigid walls, and more complicated ones at the target,
which involve the solutions of the control problem for any
number of agents less than N (see SI, Sec 1.1.1). Note
that Eq. (4) is equivalent to the stationary Schro¨dinger
equation of a quantum-mechanical many-body system of
identical particles [13, 14]. To the best of our knowledge,
an exact solution that satisfies the appropriate bound-
ary conditions is not known for a generic N , even for
simple geometries. Moreover, a numerical approach ap-
pears to be a daunting task already for three agents in
a two-dimensional domain. Approximation schemes are
therefore very valuable in order to proceed further.
3Mean-field cooperative search and the emergence of
chemotaxis. Guided by the interpretation of the lin-
ear Bellman equation as a quantum many-body prob-
lem of identical particles with short-range interaction,
we adopted a mean-field approximation scheme, which is
often successful in capturing the large-scale features of
interacting systems [15]. We remark in passing that the
mean-field approach that we take here is exactly equiva-
lent to the game-theoretical notion of cooperative mean-
field game [16] which has been applied to crowd dynamics
in a fast evacuation scenario [17].
Mean-field solutions are in general suboptimal, since a
certain amount of information is discarded by the agents
in the evaluation of the optimal action. However, if N is
large and the system is diluted enough, a mean-field ap-
proximation for Eq. (4) yields an excellent approximation
– it actually becomes exact in the closely related problem
of a confined, repulsive Bose gas [18]. We note in passing
that when the agents are all identical the best mean-field
solution is the cooperative one (see SI, Sec. 2.1.1).
This approximation consists in solving Eq. (4) with the
ansatz that the many-agent desirability Z can be factor-
ized in N copies of a single function ζ
Z(x1 . . . xN ) = ζ(x1) · · · ζ(xN ) . (5)
In this ansatz, the control exerted by each agent is only
determined by its own position x. Indeed, by combining
Eqs. (3) and (5) it follows that
u∗ = 2D∇ log ζ . (6)
The unique function ζ, which can be read as the desir-
ability of a spatial location for a single agent immersed
in a crowd, satisfies the mean-field Bellman equation
D∇2ζ − 1
2Dγ
(
q + g(N − 1)ρ) ζ = 0 , (7)
where ρ is the single-agent probability density that obeys
the Fokker-Planck equation
∂tρ+∇ · (ρu∗) = D∇2ρ . (8)
Remarkably, the set of equations (6), (7) and (8) is
identical, within proportionality factors, to a limiting
case of the well-known Patlak–Keller–Segel equations,
which was first introduced to model microbial chemo-
taxis at the population level [8, 9]
∂tn+∇ · (χn∇ log s) = D∇2n ,
Ds∇2s− ks− βns = 0 .
(9)
where n is the number density of microbes, s is the con-
centration of chemoattractant and Ds is its molecular dif-
fusivity. Comparing the Bellman equation Eq. (7) with
the second row of Eq. (9) one sees that the desirability
ζ is proportional to the chemoattractant concentration
c, to which agents respond logarithmically – they sense
only fold-changes in levels, in accord with the Weber–
Fechner law [10]. The chemotactic coefficient is χ = 2D
in this case. The chemoattractant is degraded with rate
k proportional to q/(2Dγ) and consumed at rate β pro-
portional to g/(2Dγ) per cell. We note in passing that
perfect adaptation is an implicit feature of Eqs. (6) and
(8), in that there is no chemokinesis – random motility
D does not depend on ζ.
Learning to search optimally: scouts, beacons and re-
cruitment. The main results of the previous sections are
that optimal cooperative search can be realized by bio-
physical systems in which the target emits a diffusible
chemical cue in the environment, that agents respond
chemotactically to this signal, and actively modify it.
However, it would be useful to extend this setting to the
relevant case when the location of the target is a pri-
ori unknown and the target does not spontaneously send
out signals to facilitate the work of the agents. In other
words, we seek a way to include the process of discovery
of the target’s location and the successive construction
of the solution to Eq. (7). As we show below, this can be
accomplished by adding a production term in the equa-
tion for concentration, which is the exact analog of the
process by which information is written on memory.
Our solution to the learning problem goes as follows.
Initially, the concentration is set to a constant every-
where in space. In the first part of the search process,
agents wander at random and the concentration decays
and is consumed. As a result, agents explore space away
from their initial location. This is called the scouting
process. When agents eventually reach the target, they
start the production of chemoattractant on site, either
releasing it themselves, e.g. in the form of a pheromone-
like cue [19, 20], or inducing its production by the target,
which may happen in practice by triggering specific gene
expression [21] or by transforming it into attractive waste
material. The net effect is that a beacon signal is emit-
ted from the target, and it leads to the recruitment of
all other agents towards it. A mathematically precise de-
scription of the process outlined above requires only the
addition of two terms to the optimality equation (7)
∂tζ︸︷︷︸
relaxation
−D∇2ζ+ 1
2Dγ
(
q+g(N −1)ρ) ζ = f(t)1target︸ ︷︷ ︸
production
,
(10)
where f(t) =
∫ t
0
dt′
∫
target
ds·Jρ is the cumulated number
of agents which have reached the target up to time t, and
Jρ = (2D∇ log ζ)ρ − D∇ρ is the spatial flux of agents.
The indicator function 1target specifies that production
takes place only at the target. The relaxation term is
interpreted as a delay in writing information on memory,
i.e. a learning rate. When production and diffusion bal-
ance, the optimal solution, Eq. (7), is attained. Notice
4that  is the proportionality factor between Eq. (7) and
the second equation in (9).
In the remainder of this section we illustrate how the
optimal solution is achieved in two examples of coopera-
tive search games. The first example features a circular
target in a two-dimensional domain and can be thought of
as a basic model for bacterial predation [21, 22]. In Fig. 1
we show the simulation of a large number of agents under
the controlled dynamics with optimal mean-field drift,
which can be computed exactly in this case (see SI, Sec.
3), and compare them with the uncontrolled dynamics.
From visual inspection, the gain in the number of agents
that have reached the target is apparent. More quanti-
tatively, the time average cost per agent as a function of
time (Panels c and d of Fig. 1), which is proportional to
the number of agents which have not reached the target
at a given time, falls off exponentially for the controlled
case while it exhibits a very slow decay for uncontrolled
diffusion.
The second example is crowd evacuation from a com-
plicated domain. Agents, initially localized in the center
of a maze, are required to find the exit with the minimal
cost. The domain in which we performed this numerical
experiment is a reproduction of the historical maze in
t = 0.1
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FIG. 1. Optimal cooperative predation. Comparison between
the uncontrolled a) and controlled dynamics b), in the non-
interacting case (g = 0). The agents are initially localized in
a small region of space and are required to reach the target
(grey disk). They initially undergo unbiased diffusion during
the scouting phase and when some reach the target, the re-
cruiting phase begins. The chemical cue is emitted from the
target and degraded at constant rate, resulting in a gradient
(grey contour lines, in logarithmic scale) which elicits a drift
toward the target in all other agents. In these simulations
the parameters are: γ = 1, q = 10, D = 1, g = 0,  = 0.1.
c): Average cost rate for time (uncontrolled: dashed orange
line; controlled: solid blue line) and for control (dash-dotted
blue line) The scouting phase (S, shaded) and the recruiting
(R) phase are dominated by time cost and by control cost,
respectively. d): Probability density function of the time to
reach the target (color code as in c). For small times the dis-
tributions are similar, while at large times controlled agents
display an exponential decay against a −3/2 power law for
uncontrolled ones.
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FIG. 2. Optimal crowd evacuation. Agents are injected at
a constant rate at the center of the maze and have to find
the exit (on the right side of the maze), as quickly as possi-
ble while minimizing collisions. The panels show a numerical
simulation of Eqs. (6), (8) and (10). The desirability (=con-
centration, see Table I) is shown in the top panels, while the
flux of agents Jρ is displayed in the bottom panels. During
scouting (left column), the population consumes the chemi-
cal, leading to an outward-driven scouting process, faster than
pure diffusion. Upon reaching the target, agents lay the bea-
con signal and recruit those who lag behind to the target
(middle column). Eventually, since agents are continuously
injected in this case, a stationary state is reached where agents
track the optimal path from the center to the exit (right col-
umn). The parameters are D = 1, γ = 1,  = 10−1, q = 10
and g(N − 1) = 100.
the gardens of Villa Pisani (Stra, Italy). In this example,
agents are introduced at the center of the maze at a con-
stant injection rate. In Fig. 2 we see the emergence of
the phases of scouting and recruitment, and eventually,
we observe that the agents trace out the optimal path
to the exit. Notice that, during the scouting phase, the
density of agents propagates as a front with speed which
is proportional to
√
N (see SI, Sec. 2.1.2) so that the
collective is much faster in finding the target than the
single agent (which instead reaches it diffusively).
Extension to risk-sensitive control. A convenient way
of incorporating the notion of risk in decision mak-
ing is to introduce a parameter α which exponentially
weighs the fluctuations of the cost [23, 24]. In this
setting the functional to be minimized becomes Fα =
α−1 log〈exp(α∑i ∫ cidt)〉 (see SI for details). This choice
ensures the invariance of the optimal control under a
global offset of the costs. It is easy to verify that as
α → 0 one recovers the risk-neutral case previously de-
scribed. When α is positive the optimal control is such
that fluctuations with cost higher than average are sup-
pressed, and one refers to it as a risk-averse controller.
Conversely, when α is negative, the optimal controller
feels optimistic and is risk-seeking. In this case low-cost
fluctuations are enhanced. The procedure described in
the previous section, including the mean-field approxi-
mation, can be extended to the risk-sensitive setting (see
Sections 1.2 and 2.2 of SI for a full derivation).
We find that the optimal solution to the risk-
sensitive cooperative search game is also described by the
chemotaxis equations, and a direct comparison between
Eq. (11) (with the addition of learning) and Eq. (9) yields
the dictionary in Table I. The risk-sensitive optimality
equations that generalize Eqs. (6) and (7) are

u∗ =
2D
1− 2Dαγ∇ log ζ ,
D∇2ζ − 1− 2Dαγ
2Dγ
(
q + g(N − 1)ρ) ζ = 0 , (11)
where 2Dαγ < 1.
Discussion. From the standpoint of search theory,
our findings provide a solid theoretical rationale for the
many solution methods inspired by chemotaxis, from
computational [25–27], to biological [28, 29] and physico-
chemical ones [30, 31]. At the practical level, we offer
explicit expressions for the optimal choice for the param-
eters that appear in these biomimetic approaches, allow-
ing to shortcut the painstaking procedure of parameter
tuning. Conversely, from the viewpoint of chemotaxis,
we remark that the dictionary in Table I can also be
read in reverse, which allows to solve the inverse prob-
lem of retrieving the decision-making parameters from
biophysical observations. For example, bacterial chemo-
taxis experiments (Fig. 6 in Ref. [32]) give χ/D ≈ 12,
which translates into 2Dαγ ≈ 5/6. This value is very
close to the upper limit for risk aversion, suggesting that
that bacteria try to minimize the impact of unfavorable
fluctuations – a conclusion that has also been reached by
other means [33].
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Supplemental Information
1. DERIVATION OF THE BELLMAN EQUATION FOR OPTIMAL COOPERATIVE SEARCH
Let us consider a system of N agents in d dimensions1 following the stochastic dynamics 2
dX¯t = u¯(X¯t, t) dt+
√
2DdW¯ t , (1)
where W¯ is the standard vector Wiener process, representing the uncontrolled dynamics, and u¯ is the control. In
Eq. (1) D is the diffusion coefficient, which we choose to be constant. Notice that in this case there is no ambiguity
about the regularization, in that Ito or Stratonovich conventions are equivalent. Part of the domain boundary is
absorbing and we refer to it as the target. We define the cost functional as
CT0 =
N∑
i=1
∫ min{T,Ti}
0
dt
(
γ
2
ui(X¯
t, t)2 + hi(X¯
t)
)
, (2)
where
hi(X¯
t) = q(Xti ) +
g
2
∑
j 6=i
v
(
Xti , X
t
j
)
,
q > 0 and g > 0, γ > 0 and Ti is the exit time (first passage at the target) for the i-th agent. The upper extreme
of integration in time indicates that an agent stops contributing to the total cost as soon as it hits the target. The
quadratic form of the cost for the control is directly related to the Kullback–Leibler divergence of the controlled
path measure from the uncontrolled (pure diffusion) one; therefore, the cost of the control has a natural probabilistic
interpretation in terms of “distance” between path measures [1].
We first discuss the finite-horizon setup, in which the objective of the optimization is a functional of the cost
accumulated over the fixed interval of time [0, T ], CT0 . In this case the problem is generally time-dependent. The
finite horizon setup is more general than the terminal state setup discussed in the main text, which essentially
corresponds to the limit T →∞ of Eq. (2), i.e. infinite horizon limit in presence of terminal states. In Fig. 1 is shown
a schematic representation of the terminal state problem defined in the main text, where v(x1, x2) = gδ(x1 − x2).
FIG. 1. Scheme of the cooperative search game for N = 2 agents. The agents are driven by the controls u1 and u2, which depend
on both their positions x1 and x2. They pay individual costs associated with control and time expenditure, respectively with
a rate γu2/2 and q (possibly position-dependent), and a pairwise cost associated with the interaction – collision – with a rate
proportional to a Dirac-δ function. Optimal controls minimize the average cost (or an exponential average in the risk-sensitive
case).
1 In the context of decision making, this is the term we use referring to controlled particles. Indeed, controlled diffusion is a limit of a
Markov decision process in which the term “agent” is more natural. In this Supporting Information notes we will use the words “agent”
and “particle” interchangeably.
2 Symbols expressed with a bar indicate N -tuples whose index corresponds to the label of the agent; e.g. x¯ ≡ {x1 . . . xN}. The superscript
t indicates time.
21.1. Risk-neutral case
Here we derive the Bellman equation for the optimal control which minimizes the average of the N -particle cost
function (2). In terms of the N -particle density function, p, the average cost is expressed as
F[u¯] =
〈
CT0
〉
=
∫ T
0
dt
∫
dNx
∑
i
(
γ
2
ui(x¯, t)
2 + hi(x¯)
)
p(x¯, t) . (3)
Since p has an implicit dependence on u through the Fokker–Planck equation associated with Eq. (1), it is convenient
to couch the minimization problem by including the dynamics as a constraint and seek to minimize the auxiliary
functional
L[p, u¯, Φ] = F +
∫ T
0
dt
∫
dNxΦ(x¯, t)
[
∂tp(x¯, t) +
∑
i
∇i ·
(
ui(x¯, t)p(x¯, t)−D∇ip(x¯, t)
)]
, (4)
where Φ(x¯, t) is a Lagrange multiplier. This is an application of the so-called Pontryagin minimum principle [2]. The
condition of null variation of L with respect to Φ yields the Fokker–Planck equation for the N -particle density p. The
variation of L with respect to ui, at the saddle point,
δL
δui
∣∣∣∣
∗
=
(
γ u∗i −∇iΦ
)
p = 0 , (5)
gives the optimal control
u∗i (x¯, t) = γ
−1∇iΦ(x¯, t) . (6)
Finally, the variation with respect to p gives
δL
δp
∣∣∣∣
∗
= −∂tΦ +
∑
i
(
γ
2
(u∗i )
2 − u∗i · ∇iΦ−D∇2iΦ + hi
)
= 0 , (7)
which, together with Eq. (6), leads to the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation:
∂tΦ = − 1
2γ
∑
i
(∇iΦ)2 −D∑
i
∇2iΦ +
∑
i
hi . (8)
As pointed out in the main text, the function Φ(x¯, t) is the optimal value function at time t and in the state x¯,
up to an additive constant: this is (minus) the expected cost-to-go under the optimal control u¯∗ when the system is
conditioned to be in state x¯ at time t, namely
Φ(x¯, t) ≡ −〈CTt ∣∣X¯t = x¯〉∗ = −∫ ∞
t
dt′
∫
dNx′
∑
i
(
γ
2
u∗i (x¯
′, t′)2 + hi(x¯′)
)
p(x¯′, t′) , (9)
where p satisfies the Fokker–Planck equation with control u¯∗ and has initial condition
p(x¯′, t) = δN (x¯′ − x¯) .
Indeed, it can be directly verified that the r.h.s. of Eq. (9) satisfies the saddle-point equation (7).
The HJB equation (8) is non-linear. However, it is possible to make it linear by the Hopf–Cole transformation,
Z = exp (Φ/2Dγ) (10)
which turns Eq. (8) into
∂tZ = −D
∑
i
∇2iZ +
1
2Dγ
q Z , (11)
and the optimal control into
u∗i = 2D∇i logZ . (12)
In the main text we focused on a terminal state optimal control problem. In such a setup, when the uncontrolled
dynamics is time-homogeneous and the costs hi do not depend explicitly on time, the HJB equation admits stationary
solutions, Φ(x¯) and Z(x¯).
31.1.1. Boundary conditions
The optimal control is found from the stationary solution of Eq. (11) with appropriate boundary conditions. Here
we discuss the structure of these boundary conditions at the target. We start by recalling the relationship of the
desirability Z with the optimal cost-to-go function,
Z(x¯) = e−〈C
∞
0 |X¯0=x¯〉∗/2Dγ ,
obtained from Eq. (9) and the Hopf–Cole transformation. From the definition of the cost function, once an agent
reaches the target it does not contribute to the cost any longer. Let us assume that all the agents are inside the domain
except one, which we choose to be agent N without loss of generality, which sits at the target: X0N = xN ∈ target.
Then, since agent N does not contribute to the cost, the desirability is a function of the remaining N−1 agents only 3
Z(N)(x1 . . . xN−1, xN )
∣∣
xN∈target = Z
(N−1)(x1 . . . xN−1) ; (13)
more generally, if the agents 1 . . . i (up to relabeling) are not yet at the target, while the others have already reached
it, one has
Z(N)(x1 . . . xi, xi+1 . . . xN )
∣∣
xi+1...xN∈target = Z
(i)(x1 . . . xi) . (14)
1.2. Risk-sensitive case
Here we show that the risk-sensitive Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation can also be linearized. In the risk-sensitive
setup, agents aim at the minimization of the average of an exponentially weighted cost [3]
Fα =
1
α
log
〈
eαC
T
0
〉
=
1
α
logGα , (15)
where CT0 is defined in Eq. (2). In this section we only consider α > 0, so the problem is equivalent to the minimization
of the functional Gα = expαFα. It is easy to generalize the derivation for α < 0.
The parameter α defines the risk sensitivity of the optimal control problem: one recognizes that in the limit α→ 0,
Fα → F =
〈
CT0
〉
, and the control problem is know as risk-neutral; if α > 0 the optimal solution is the one that
reduces the most the fluctuations towards high values of the cost, corresponding to a risk-averse strategy; finally,
α < 0 corresponds to an optimization in which more weight is given to the values of CT0 which are smaller than
average, therefore leading to risk-seeking strategies. The limits α→∞ and α→ −∞ are referred to as min-max and
min-min optimization problems, respectively.
We apply the Pontryagin principle to the minimization of the functional Gα. It is convenient to consider the Markov
process {X¯t, Ct0}t, where X¯t follows the stochastic dynamics in Eq. (1), while from Eq. (2)
dCt0 =
∑
i
(
γ
2
ui(X¯
t, t)2 + hi(X¯
t)
)
dt ≡ c(X¯t) dt
The Fokker–Planck equation associated to this system of equations, which describes the evolution of the probability
density function p(x¯, C, t) for the process {X¯t, Ct0}, is
∂tp+ ∂C
(
c(x¯) p
)
+
∑
i
∇i
(
ui p−D∇ip
)
= 0 (16)
The functional Gα can be then expressed as a linear functional of p:
Gα =
∫
dNx dC p(x¯, C, T ) eαC ≡
∫
dNxGα(x¯, T ) ; (17)
the function Gα(x¯, t) is the average of expαC
t
0 over all trajectories which have arrived at x¯ at time t. By multiplying
Eq. (16) by expαC and integrating over C, one recovers the forward Feynman–Kac equation for Gα:
∂tGα +
∑
i
∇i ·
(
uiGα −D∇iGα
)
= α cGα . (18)
3 For the sole purpose of illustrating the boundary conditions defining the many-particle optimal control problem, we introduce the
notation Z(n) to indicate the desirability function Z for the problem with n agents (when Z is a function of n spatial variables).
4The Pontryagin principle is then applied to the minimization of the functional Fα subject to the constraint imposed
by Eq. (18); this is equivalent to perform the unconstrained minimization of the Lagrange functional
Lα =
∫
dNxGα(x¯, T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gα
+
∫ T
0
dt
∫
dNxΨα(x¯, t)
[
∂tGα +
∑
i
∇i ·
(
uiGα −D∇iGα
)
− α
∑
i
(γ
2
u2i + hi
)
Gα
]
. (19)
At the saddle point, variation with respect to the control ui yields
δLα
δui
∣∣∣∣
∗
= −Gα
(
∇iΨα + αγ u∗iΨα
)
= 0 (20)
so the optimal control is
u∗i = −
1
γα
∇i log Ψα . (21)
The variation with respect to Gα gives
∂Lα
δGα
∣∣∣∣
∗
= δ(t− T )− ∂tΨα −
∑
i
u∗i · ∇iΨα −D
∑
i
∇2iΨα − α
∑
i
(γ
2
u∗i
2 + hi
)
Ψα = 0 , (22)
which is the backward Feynman–Kac equation for the function Ψα, which can be interpreted (up to multiplicative
constants) as
Ψα(x¯, t) ≡
〈
eαC
T
t
∣∣X¯t = x¯〉 ; (23)
the δ-function in time sets the condition at the final time, if a finite-horizon problem is considered; in our terminal
state setup, T → ∞ and the δ-function disappears, so we omit it in the following. Note that Φα ≡ −α−1 log Ψα,
plays the role of the value, in that u∗i = γ
−1∇iΦα. Indeed, in the limit α → 0, Φα reduces to the (risk-neutral)
value function Φ 4. We therefore identify Φα with the risk-sensitive value function [4, 5]. The HJB equation for the
risk-sensitive value function then is
∂tΦα = −
( 1
2γ
−Dα
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡1/2γ˜
(∇iΦα)2 −D
∑
i
∇2iΦα +
∑
i
hi ; (24)
this equation has the same form as Eq. (8), where the parameter γ is replaced by γ˜ ≡ γ/(1 − 2Dαγ). In the same
way as for the risk-neutral case, a linearized version of the HJB equation can be found by performing the Hopf–Cole
transformation
Zα = exp (Φα/2Dγ˜) (25)
to obtain
∂tZα = −D
∑
i
∇2iZα +
1
2Dγ˜
∑
i
hi Zα . (26)
The optimal control is hence obtained from Zα as
u∗i =
2Dγ˜
γ
∇i logZα . (27)
It is straightforward that for α = 0, the optimal control equations (26) and (27) exactly reduce to the risk-neutral
ones, respectively (11) and (12). As for the boundary conditions for Eq. (26), the same considerations made for the
risk-neutral case hold here: Eqs. (13) and (14) are valid also in this case, with Z being replaced by Zα.
4 Ψα, as defined in Eq. (23), is the moment generating function for the statistics of the cost CTt conditioned to X¯
t = x¯. When α→ 0,
Φα = −α−1 log Ψα → −∂Ψα
∂α
∣∣∣
α=0
= −〈CTt |X¯t = x¯〉 ≡ Φ .
51.3. Exact solution for the 1D non-interacting case
In this subsection we offer the exact analytic calculation for the non-interacting search in one dimension. The results
also provide an approximation to the solution for the multi-dimensional case at large distances from the target.
A single agent is initially at x on the real axis and the target is at the origin; the generating function of the cost
under the control u, G˜s(x) = 〈exp(−sCT0 )|X0 = x〉, satisfies the (stationary) Feynman–Kac equation
u G˜′s +D G˜
′′
s = s
(γ
2
u2 + q
)
G˜s , (28)
with boundary conditions G˜s(0) = 1 and G˜s(±∞) = 0 if s > 0 and G˜s(±∞) = +∞ if s < 0. Assuming that the
control is constant and pointing toward the origin 5, u = −sign(x)U , with U positive, one can easily find that Eq. (28)
is solved by
G˜s = exp
{
β|x|(1−√1 + Γs)} , (29)
where β = U/(2D) and Γ = 2D(γ + 2q/U2). We can indeed check that the optimal control U∗ obtained from the
one-dimensional HJB equation is the one which minimizes Fα|X0=x = α−1 log G˜−α:
∂
∂U
Fα|X0=x = ∂
∂U
{
U |x|
2Dα
(
1−
√
1− 2Dα
(
γ +
2q
U2
))}
= 0 , (30)
solved by
U∗ =
√
2q
γ(1− 2Dαγ) . (31)
The probability distribution of the cost CT0 under the control U is found by applying the inverse Laplace transform
to Eq. (29),
p(c|X0 = x) = 1
2pii
∫ +i∞
−i∞
ds G˜s =
eβ|x|−c/Γ
β2x2Γ
1
2pii
∫ 0++i∞
0+−i∞
dt e−
√
tet c/(β
2x2Γ)
=
β|x|√Γ eβ|x|
2
√
pi
c−3/2 e−(β
2x2Γ)/(4c)−c/Γ , (32)
To obtain the second equality the change of variable t = (βx)2(1 + Γs) has been made, while in the last equality one
makes use of Eq. [318] from Ref. [6]. The important remark is that in Eq. (32) the right tail of the probability density
of the cost has an exponential cutoff with rate
1
Γ
=
1
2D(γ + 2q/U2)
<
1
2Dγ
= αmax . (33)
This result implies that, for any value of U , 〈eαCT0 〉 diverges when α > αmax. In particular, in the limit α → α−max,
the functional 〈eαCT0 〉 diverges also for controls arbitrarily close to the optimal one, for which Γ−1 = αmax.
1.4. Robustness of the optimal solution
The analytical solution in one dimension also allows to address the question about the robustness of the cost against
perturbations in the control away from optimality. For controls U close to the optimal value U∗, the risk-sensitive
cost Fα can be approximated by a quadratic function,
Fα − F∗α︸ ︷︷ ︸
δFα
' 1
2
F′′α(U
∗)
(
U − U∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
δU
)2
.
5 We know from the exact solution that the optimal control in one dimension is constant: this follows from the fact that the solution
of the HJB equation D∇2Zα = q/(2Dγ˜)Zα with the boundary conditions specified above is solved by Zα = exp{−[q/(2D2γ˜)]1/2|x|},
which produces u∗ = 2Dγ˜/γ∇ logZα = −sign(x)(2qγ˜)1/2/γ, whose amplitude is independent of the coordinate x.
6In this approximation one can calculate the maximum tolerance on the control amplitude U , given an allowed level
of suboptimality. Using the results from the previous subsection one obtains
δFα
F∗α
=
1
2(1− 2Dαγ)
(
δU
U∗
)2
=
χ
4D
(
δU
U∗
)2
(34)
(see also Fig. 2). In the risk-neutral case, a relative error in the choice of U∗ of 10% results in a small increase of
0.5% for the total cost incurred. Risk-averse strategies tend to be less tolerant to errors, while risk-sensitive ones are
more forgiving. We also remark that for α > 0, the control amplitude is bound to be larger than a minimum value
Umin =
√
2Dαγ U∗, below which the risk-sensitive cost diverges.
1.5. Other forms for the cost of the control
The assumption that the cost for control is quadratic is particularly useful for two reasons. First, as we already
remarked, it has a direct interpretation in terms of entropy and distance (Kullback–Leibler divergence) between
ensembles of paths. Second, it has the property that the optimal control problem is linearly solvable (through the
Hopf–Cole transformation the optimality equations can be cast into a linear form). Moreover, it has a physical
interpretation, as the power dissipated moving in a viscous medium. Obviously, this is not the most general form for
the control cost which can be physically motivated. One can use a generic function of |u|. For instance, the control
cost of the form η |u| corresponds, in the low noise limit, to the minimization of the path length to the target.
Here we derive the optimal HJB equation for a target location problem with a single agent and in the risk neutral
case, where the control cost has the form an extra contribution which is linear in the control amplitude, η |u|. The
minimization of the cost function constrained to the dynamics given by Eq. (1) is translated in the unconstrained
minimization of the Lagrange functional
L[u, p, φ] =
∫ ∞
0
dt
∫
dx
(
γ
2
u(x, t)2 + η |u(x, t)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
control
+ q(x)︸︷︷︸
time
)
p(x, t) +
∫ ∞
0
dt
∫
dxφ(x, t)
(
∂tp+∇ ·
(
u p
)−D∇2p)
The stationarity with respect to u yields the equation for the optimal control
γ u∗ + η
u∗∣∣u∗∣∣ = ∇φ (35)
0
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FIG. 2. Robustness of the optimal solution. The risk-sensitive cost function Fα is plotted as a function of the control
amplitude U , in a risk-neutral (solid blue), risk-averse (dashed red) and risk-seeking (dashed-dotted green) situation. The
parabolic approximation around the minimum is shown for the risk-neutral case (dotted blue line). A deviation of the control
from the optimum by a quantity δU corresponds to an increase in the cost δF (in the parabolic approximation). These two
quantities are related by Eq. (34). Curves have been obtained with the same parameters as in Figs. 2 and 4 of the main text.
7and with respect to p gives the optimality HJB equation
∂tφ+D∇2φ+ 1
2γ
∣∣∇φ∣∣2 − η∣∣∇φ∣∣ = q − η2
2γ
. (36)
Through the Hopf–Cole transformation φ = 2Dγ logZ, the HJB equation becomes
∂tZ +D∇2Z + η
∣∣∇Z∣∣ = 1
2Dγ
(
q − η
2
2γ
)
Z . (37)
The dynamics of the desirability (chemoattractant) Z acquires a ballistic contribution, such that in addition to the
diffusive motion it also propagates as a front.
2. MEAN-FIELD APPROXIMATION
The Bellman equation (26) is equivalent to the stationary Schro¨dinger equation with zero energy for a system of N
identical interacting particles. It seems impossible to solve it exactly with the boundary conditions discussed above.
We therefore proposed a mean-field approximation scheme which is motivated both physically (for large number of
particles and reasonably diluted systems) and from the game-theoretical point of view (inspired by mean-field games).
2.1. Risk-neutral case
For α = 0 the mean-field approximation to this equation consists in factorizing the N -point solution Z into the
product of identical functions of the individual variables:
Z(x1 . . . xN )
MF
=
N∏
i=1
ζ(xi) ; (38)
from this mean-field ansatz it follows that the controls are
u∗i = 2D∇ log ζ(xi) , (39)
and that the N -particle density function is also factorized in single-particle distribution functions,
p(x1 . . . xN ) =
N∏
i=1
ρ(xi) (40)
(provided that the initial positions of the N particles are independent); the single-particle density ρ then satisfies
∂tρ+∇ · (u ρ) = D∇2ρ . (41)
One can then replace the ansatz in Eqs. (39) and (40) in the cost functional F to obtain the cost-per-particle functional
F˜ =
∫
dt
∫
dx
(
γ
2
u(x, t)2 + q(x) +
N − 1
2
∫
dy v(x, y)ρ(y, t)
)
ρ(x, t) (42)
The mean-field optimal control equations follow by applying the Pontryagin principle to the functional F˜ under the
constraint (41), i.e. as the saddle point equations for the Lagrange functional
L˜ = F˜ +
∫
dt
∫
dxφ(x, t)
(
∂tρ+∇ · (u ρ)−D∇2ρ
)
, (43)
where variations have to be calculated with respect to the single particle functions u, ρ (and φ, yielding the constraint).
This leads to
δL˜
δu(x, t)
∣∣∣∣
∗
= ρ
(
γu∗ −∇φ) = 0 ⇒ u∗(x, t) = γ−1∇φ(x, t) , (44)
8and
δL˜
δρ(x, t)
∣∣∣∣
∗
=
γ
2
u∗2 + hmf − ∂tφ− u∗ · ∇φ−D∇2φ
= −∂tφ− 1
2γ
(∇φ)2 −D∇2φ+ hmf = 0 , (45)
where hmf is the mean-field cost
hmf(xi, t) = q(xi) + (N − 1)
∫
dy v(xi, y) ρ(y, t) . (46)
When v is a contact interaction potential, v(x, y) = g δ(x− y), one has
hmf = q + g (N − 1) ρ . (47)
By applying the Hopf–Cole transformation φ = 2Dγ log ζ, one finally gets the HJB equation for the mean-field
desirability, ζ,
∂tζ −D∇2ζ = 1
2Dγ
hmf ζ , (48)
which for contact potential reads
∂tζ −D∇2ζ = 1
2Dγ
(
q + g(N − 1)ρ
)
ζ . (49)
2.1.1. Optimality of the cooperative solution
In this section we show that the best mean-field solution is indeed the cooperative one, i.e. the one in which the
individual controls are identical.
Let us assume that out of the total N agents, N1 are of one species and N2 = N −N1 are of a second species, with
different control. We can, for the sake of generality, introduce different collision costs depending on the species of the
agents involved. Therefore, the cost rate for an agent of species α colliding with an agent of species β is gαβ/2. The
mean-field costs incurred by individual agents of species 1 and 2 are
C1 = C¯1 +
1
2
∫
dt dt
[
g11(N1 − 1) ρ21 + g12(N −N1)ρ1 ρ2
]
, (50a)
C2 = C¯2 +
1
2
∫
dt dt
[
g21N1 ρ1 ρ2 + g22(N −N1 − 1)ρ22
]
, (50b)
where C¯α is the control and time cost for an agent of species α,
C¯α =
∫
dt dx ρα
(γα
2
u2α + qα
)
. (51)
The goal of each agent of species α is to maximize the cost Cα. We shall see that if the collision costs do not depend
on the species involved, i.e. gij = g, the best partition of the system is N1 = 0 or N1 = N .
One observes that C1 and C2 both have linear dependence on N1:
∂C1
∂N1
=
g
2
∫
dt dt
[
ρ21 − ρ1 ρ2
]
, (52a)
∂C2
∂N1
=
g
2
∫
dt dt
[
ρ1 ρ2 − ρ22
]
. (52b)
If C1 decreases with N1 and C2 increases with N1 (i.e. decreases with N2), or viceversa, then the two species should
coexist. Assuming ∂C1/∂N1 < 0 and ∂C2/∂N1 > 0 would imply
0 >
∂C1
∂N1
− ∂C2
∂N1
=
g
2
∫
dt dx
[
ρ1 − ρ2
]2
which is not possible. The same conclusion holds for ∂C1/∂N1 > 0 and ∂C2/∂N1 < 0. Therefore, one must have both
C1 and C2 decreasing (or increasing) functions of N1, which makes it more desirable to have N1 → N (or N1 → 0)
for both species.
92.1.2. Effect of the collision cost: travelling wave solution of PKS in 1D
As remarked in the main text, the optimal control equations in the mean-field approximation are equivalent to the
Patlak–Keller–Segel (PKS) equations with logaritmic response. In this section we show that in the case where q = 0
(no time expenditure cost) it is possible to find travelling wave solution to the PKS equations in one dimension [7].
We shall see that the combination g(N − 1) enters the definition of the travelling wave velocity.
In one dimension, the optimal control equations for q = 0 areD∂
2
xζ −
1
2Dγ
(
q + g(N − 1)ρ)ζ = 0 ,
∂tρ+ 2D∂x
(
ρ ∂xζ/ζ
)−D∂2xρ = 0 . (53)
We impose the boundary conditions ζ(−∞) = 0, ζ(+∞) = 1, ρ(−∞) = ρ∞ and ρ(+∞) = 0. Such boundary
conditions correspond to the situation in which a constant supply of agents is provided very far on the left and the
target is far on the right. The system admit a travelling wave solution, ζ(x, t) = Z(x − ct) and ρ(x, t) = R(x − ct),
with velocity c > 0. With this ansatz, Eqs. (53) writeDZ
′′ − g(N − 1)
2Dγ
RZ = 0 ,
− cR′ + 2D(RZ ′/Z)′ −DR′′ = 0 , (54)
where the symbol ′ indicates the derivative with respect to the single variable z = x− ct. The second equation in the
system (54) can be straightforwardly integrated once and gives
R′ = (2Z ′/Z − κ)R+ β ,
where κ = c/D. If we impose the boundary conditions R|∞ = 0 and R′|∞ = 0, the integration constant β vanishes.
One further integration gives
logR = 2 logZ − κz + α ⇒ R(z) = Ae−κz Z(z)2 .
By replacing this solution into the first equation of the system (54), and by defining Z(z) = eκz/2χ(z)
Dχ′′ + cχ′ +
1
2D
(c2
2
− g(N − 1)
γ
Aχ2
)
χ = 0 , (55)
Notice that R = Aχ2, and therefore the boundary conditions for χ follow from the ones for ρ. From the stability
condition c2/2− g(N − 1)Aχ2(−∞)/γ = 0, it follows that the speed of the wave front is
c =
√
2ρ∞
γ
g(N − 1) . (56)
The number of agents therefore influences the speed at which the agent density profile propagates: more agents
consume the chemoattractant more rapidly, hence giving rise to steepest gradients of its concentration ζ, which then
yields stronger drift.
2.2. Risk-sensitive case
We now derive the mean-field equation for the risk-sensitive case, in particular the risk-averse one, α > 0 (easily
extended to the risk-seeking one, α < 0). In this case, the mean-field ansatz consists in assuming that the single-
particle contributions to the total cost are independent and identically distributed. We start by writing the evolution
of the joint stochastic process of particle positions and individual costs as the 2N coupled equations
dXti = ui
(
Xt1, . . . X
t
N
)
dt+
√
2DdW ti ,
dCti =
(γ
2
ui(X
t
1, . . . X
t
N , t)
2
+ q(Xti ) +
1
2
∑
j 6=i
v(Xti , X
t
i )
)
dt ≡ ci
(
Xt1, . . . X
t
N , t
)
dt ,
(57)
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The N -particle position-cost density pxc(x1, C1 . . . xN , CN , t) associated to Eqs. (57) is also factorized
pxc(x1, C1 . . . xN , CN , t)
MF
=
∏
i
ρxc(xi, Ci, t) , (58)
following from the assumption that the controls are given by a unique function of the individual one-particle positions,
namely
ui(X
t
1, . . . X
t
N , t)
MF
= u(Xti , t) . (59)
It follows that the cost functional Gα also factorizes:
Gα =
∫
dx1 dC1 . . . dxN dCN pxc(x1, C1 . . . xN , CN , T ) e
α
∑
i Ci
MF
=
(∫
dx dC ρxc(x,C, T )e
αC
)N
. (60)
The Fokker–Planck equation associated with Eqs. (57) is
∂tpxc +
∑
i
∂Ci
(
ci(x¯, t) pxc
)
+
∑
i
∇i
(
ui pxc −D∇ipxc
)
= 0 , (61)
and can be marginalized to the single-particle one by integrating over all particles but one:
∂tρxc +∇ · (uρxc) + ∂C
[(γ
2
u2 + q +
N − 1
2
∫
dx′ dC ′ v(x, x′)ρxc(x′, C ′)
)
ρxc
]
−D∇2ρxc = 0 . (62)
The mean-field optimal control equations are then derived (applying Pontryagin principle) as the saddle point
equations of the functional
L˜α =
∫
dx dC ρxc(x,C, T )e
αC +
∫
dx dC dt χα(x,C, t)
{
∂tρxc(x,C, t) +∇ · (u(x, t)ρxc(x,C, t))−D∇2ρxc(x,C, t)
+ ∂C
[(γ
2
u(x, t)2 + q(x) +
N − 1
2
∫
dx′ dC ′ v(x, x′)ρxc(x′, C ′, t)
)
ρxc(x,C, t)
]}
(63)
Variation with respect to the control yields
δL˜α
δu(x, t)
∣∣∣∣
∗
= −
∫
dC ρxc(x,C, t)
[
∇χα(x,C, t) + γu(x, t)∂Cχα(x,C, t)
]
= 0 , (64)
and with respect to ρxc
δL˜α
δρxc(x,C, t)
∣∣∣∣
∗
= eαC δ(t− T )−
(
∂tχα + u
∗ · ∇χα +D∇2χα +
(
γu∗2/2 + hmf
)
∂Cχα
)
= 0 , (65)
which is the (backward) equation for the functional χα(x,C, t) =
〈
expαCT0
∣∣Xt = x, Ct0 = C〉∗, where hmf is the
mean-field cost Eq. (46).
hmf(x, t) = q(x) + (N − 1)
∫
dx′
∫
dC ′ρxc(x′, C ′, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ(x′,t)
v(x, x′) . (66)
The δ-function at the final time sets the condition χα|t=T = eαC . We notice that the function χα can be expressed as
χα(x,C, t) =
〈
eα(C
t
0+C
T
t )
∣∣Xt = x, Ct0 = C〉∗ = eαC 〈eαCTt ∣∣Xt = x〉∗ ≡ eαCψα(x, t) (67)
We therefore see that the optimal control can be written in terms of ψα(x, t)
u∗(x, t) =
1
γ
∇
(
− 1
α
logψα(x, t)
)
, (68)
i.e. as the gradient of the risk-sensitive (mean-field) value function φα = −α−1 logψα, which satisfies the HJB equation
∂tφα +
1
2γ˜
(∇φα)2 +D∇2φα = hmf , (69)
where we recall from the previous section that γ˜ = γ/(1 − 2Dαγ). The mean-field desirability ζα = exp(φα/2Dγ˜)
then satisfies the linear HJB equation
∂tζα +D∇2ζα = 1
2Dγ˜
hmf ζα . (70)
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3. EXACT SOLUTION FOR THE CIRCULAR TARGET IN THE NON-INTERACTING CASE
It is possible to solve analytically the HJB equation (for the desirability, in the terminal state setup) for the search
problem of a circular target in the infinite two-dimensional space, in absence of interactions. In this case, the mean-
field ansatz is trivially exact, provided that the particles are independently distributed at the initial time. If the
target has radius R and we choose the origin of the coordinate system to be its center, the HJB equation in cylindrical
coordinates reads
D
r
∂r
(
r∂rζα
)
− q
2Dγ˜
ζα = 0 , (71)
where the desirability ζα depends only on the radial coordinate, and, from previous sections, γ˜ = γ/(1 − 2Dαγ).
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FIG. 3. Risk-neutral vs Risk-sensitive. Two-dimensional histograms of time-expenditure and control costs, from simulations
of Eq. (1) with the mean-field control in Eq. (73), for the risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-seeking situation. The costs for
time-expenditure and control are positively and almost linearly correlated. The optimal control for the risk-neutral problem is
such that control and time-expenditure costs are very similar. Instead, the risk-averse optimal controller tends to pay more on
control (reducing possible dangerous fluctuations towards high values of the cost), whereas the risk-seeking controller allows
for large time-expenditure cost while reducing the control.
Given the connection of the desirability with the expected cost-to-go function (see main text), the boundary conditions
for Eq. (71) are ζ(r →∞) = 0 and ζ(R) = 1. The solution to this problem is
ζα(r) =
K0
(√
q
2D2γ˜ r
)
K0
(√
q
2D2γ˜ R
) , (72)
which yields the optimal control
u =
2Dγ˜
γ
∇ log ζα = −
√
2γ˜q
γ
K1
(√
q
2D2γ˜ r
)
K0
(√
q
2D2γ˜ r
) eˆr , (73)
where Kν are the modified Bessel functions of second kind and eˆr ≡ x/r, i.e. the outward unit vector pointing to x
from the origin.
In Fig. 3, one can see that the risk-sensitivity parameter sets an imbalance between the control cost and the time-
expenditure cost: risk-averse strategies are prone to pay much more price on control than on time-expenditure, while
for risk-neutral strategies the difference is much less pronounced; risk-seeking controllers, instead, pay less cost in
12
control, confident of being driven to the target by the noise.
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